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OvershootThis paper presents an overview of the study design for, and the results of, the EMF 22 International
Scenarios. The EMF 22 International Scenarios engaged ten of the world's leading integrated assessment (IA)
models to focus on the combined implications of three factors integral to international climate negotiations:
(1) the long-term climate-related target, expressed in this study in terms of the CO2-equivalent (CO2-e)
concentration associated with the GHGs regulated under the Kyoto Protocol, (2) whether or not this target
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the nature of international participation in emissions mitigation. The EMF 22 International Scenarios are
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Stabilizing the global climate will require substantial reductions in
emissions of all greenhouse gases (GHGs). Indeed, emissions of the
most important anthropogenic GHG, carbon dioxide (CO2), must
eventually approach zero to stabilize atmospheric CO2 concentrations.
It will be impossible to achieve reductions of this degree, and therefore
to achieve stabilization, without comprehensive international action.
The challenge of deep emissions reduction stands in sharp contrast to
present emissionsmitigation around theworld. Both near- and long-term
policies are still under development throughoutmuch of theworld; those
policies in place are characterized by varying approaches and levels of
ambition. Yet, the majority of literature on GHG stabilization is largely
predicated on the assumption that all nations take actions immediately,
reducing emissions whenever and wherever it is cheapest to do so (e.g.,
the majority of the mitigation scenarios in Fisher et al., 2007 and Clarke
et al., 2007). Hence, a practical question is how to proceed in the near-
term with differentiated degrees of mitigation while still treading on a
path toward long-term, climate-related targets (e.g., a 2 °C increase in
global mean surface temperature relative to preindustrial levels1).The purpose of the EMF 22 International Scenarios is to address this
question. The EMF 22 International Scenarios engaged ten leading
integrated assessment (IA) models from around the world to focus on
the combined implications of three factors: (1) the long-term climate-
related target, expressed in this study in terms of the CO2-equivalent
(CO2-e) concentration associated with the GHGs regulated under the
Kyoto Protocol (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6),2 (2) whether or not
this target can be temporarily exceeded prior to 2100 (“overshoot”)
allowing for greater near-term ﬂexibility, and (3) the nature of
international participation in emissions mitigation. The EMF 22 Interna-
tional Scenarios are based on combinations of these dimensions,
embodied in ten speciﬁc climate-action cases that all modeling groups
in the study attempted to represent.
Within this context, the EMF 22 International Scenarios provide
insights into such questions as: How aggressively should developed
countries such as theU.S. and E.U. act given expectations about action in
emerging economies such as India and China? What long-term targets
are possible based on mitigation levels currently being debated or
planned in thedeveloped regions?Whatwill be thenear-termand long-
term economic consequences of meeting particular climate-relatedntration is the concentration of CO2 that would lead, by itself, to
the Earth's radiative balance as the combined concentrations of a
-active substances (Fisher et al., 2007). In this paper, unless
2-e concentrations refer to the combined effects of the Kyoto
paper also discusses the emissions and implications of non-Kyoto
the gases regulated under the Montreal Protocol and aerosols.
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system? If some countries act before others, how much will emissions
“leak” from those that are acting to those that are not? How much
ﬂexibility is gainedby allowing concentrations to temporarily overshoot
long-term goals, and what are the other implications of overshoot
pathways? These are important questions for negotiators working to
craft global and regional climate architectures; and they will remain
important questions well beyond current negotiations.
The EMF 22 International Scenarios are not the ﬁrst effort to explore
these three dimensions. They build on recent research that explores
the implications of delayed participation in emissions mitigation (e.g.,
Bosetti et al., 2008; Edmonds et al., 2008; Richels et al., 2008) alongwith
research exploring the implications of overshoot pathways toward
concentration targets (e.g., denElzen andvanVuuren, 2007; vanVuuren
et al., 2007; Rao et al., 2008; Clarke et al., 2009).Whereas these previous
studies were conducted independently, the EMF 22 International
Scenarios provide a consistent multi-model approach to these issues.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides
an overview of the design of the EMF 22 International Scenarios,
including a discussion of ways to link key climate-related metrics such
as concentrations, radiative forcing, and temperature. Section 3 iden-
tiﬁes the scenarios that were produced for this study. Of particular
interest are those situations in whichmodeling groups were not able to
produce scenarios representing the more challenging cases. Section 4
discusses the emissions, concentrations, and temperature implications
of the scenarios. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the energy system and
economic results. Finally, Section 7 introduces other issues raised by
individual papers in this volume, and Section 8 provides summary
thoughts.
2. Study design
2.1. Overview of the study design
A total of ten climate-action cases were explored in these EMF 22
International Scenarios (Table 1), based on combinations of three
different dimensions of mitigation:
• The long-term concentration target. Three long-term concentration
targets for the Kyoto GHGs are explored: (1) 450 ppmv CO2-e [2.6 W/
m2], (2) 550 ppmv CO2-e [3.7 W/m2], and (3) 650 ppmv CO2-e
[4.5 W/m2];
• The option to overshoot the long-term concentration target this
century. Twooptions are explored: (1) a not-to-exceed formulation in
which the long-term target cannot be exceeded at any point and (2)
an overshoot formulation in which the long-term target must be met
by 2100, but in which concentrations can temporarily exceed the
target prior to 2100.
• The time-path of international participation in mitigation. Two
assumptions regarding international participation in emissions reduc-
tion are explored: (1) full initial participation and (2) an architecture
in which many-regions do not engage in climate mitigation until
2030 or beyond.
Allmodeling groupswere required to attempt to produce scenarios
representing each of these ten climate-action cases; however, as willTable 1
The ten climate-action cases explored in the EMF 22 International Scenarios.
Full participation Delayed participation
450 CO2-e Not-to-exceed X X
Overshoot X X
550 CO2-e Not-to-exceed X X
Overshoot X X
650 CO2-e Not-to-exceed X X
Overshoot Not modeled Not modeledbe discussed in Section 3, no group succeeded in producing scenarios
for all ten, and this result itself provides insight into the relative
difﬁculty of the cases. In addition to the ten cases, all modeling groups
were required to provide a reference, or no-climate-action, scenario as
a point of departure for interpreting the climate-action scenarios.
With the exception of the three dimensions that deﬁne the
climate-action cases, no attempt was made to standardize the models
or scenarios. The variation in modeling approaches and assumptions
is a deﬁning characteristic of this study. The resulting differences
across scenarios shed light on how key forces may evolve over time
and the implications for meeting the three climate targets in this
study under differing assumptions regarding overshoot and global
participation.
2.2. Participating models
Ten models participated in the EMF 22 International Scenarios
(Table 2). All participating models are global in scale and include sub-
models of the physical processes that convert global GHG emissions
into global GHG concentrations. Some modeling groups attempted all
or particular climate-action cases with multiple versions of their
models, as shown in Table 2. Including all model versions, 14 models
participated in the study.3 Table 2 also includes information on key
supply technologies included in the scenarios, the time periods used
to represent delayed participation, themodel's intertemporal solution
approach, and the papers in this volume associated with each model.
2.3. The three long-term concentration targets and the link to temperature
The three long-term climate-related targets explored in this study
are deﬁned in terms of the combined impact on the Earth's radiative
balance of the primary anthropogenic GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2),
nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), hydroﬂuorocarbons (HFCs),
perﬂuorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexaﬂuoride (SF6). These gases
are known as the Kyoto gases, because they form the basis for targets
in the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto gases do not include other GHGs such
as the Montreal Protocol gases or other radiatively-active substances
such as aerosols.
Expressed in terms of radiative forcing (i.e., the impact on the
Earth's radiative balance), the three concentration targets explored in
this study are 2.6 W/m2, 3.7 W/m2, and 4.5 W/m2. These radiative
forcing levels correspond to CO2-e concentrations of 450 ppmv CO2-e,
550 CO2-e, and 650 CO2-e. The concentration targets must be met in
all scenarios by 2100, which is the end of the study period. However,
as we will discuss later in this section, one option is for scenarios to
overshoot the target prior to 2100.
The CO2-e concentration associated with the Kyoto gases is only
one of several useful climate-related metrics. Table 3 provides a
guide to the relationship between the Kyoto CO2-e concentrations and
other important climate metrics.
The third column in Table 3 shows the CO2 concentrations in 2100
across all the scenarios that were submitted for this study. CO2
concentrations are lower than the associated CO2-e concentration
targets, because CO2 is only one of the constituents of which the CO2-e
concentrations are composed. For example, in the scenarios from this
study, 450 ppmv CO2-e in 2100 corresponds to anywhere between
355 ppmv CO2 and 415 ppmv CO2 in 2100. Hence, the 450 ppmv
CO2-e scenarios correspond to a futurewith CO2 concentration roughly
at today's levels or below. It follows that, 450 ppmv CO2-e is a far
more aggressive target than 450 ppmv CO2.3 In this paper, the term “model” is used to refer both to the ten models that were
used in the study and the 14 individual versions of models that were submitted,
including the multiple versions of speciﬁc models. As will be demonstrated throughout
the paper, the variations in model versions for single models were often signiﬁcant
enough to result in very different scenarios.
Table 2


















CCS Bio w/CCS Group 2 Group 3
ETSAP-TIAM (Canada) One Version Yes Yes Yes 10 2020 2040 Intertemporal optimization Loulou et al.
(2009-this issue)
FUND (E.U) One Version No speciﬁc technologies 1 2029 2049 Intertemporal optimization Tol (2009-this issue)
GTEM (Australia) One Version Yes Yes No 1 2029 2049 Recursive dynamic Gurney et al.
(2009-this issue)
IMAGE (E.U.) IMAGE Yes Yes No 1 2029 2049 Recursive dynamic van Vliet et al.
(2009-this issue)IMAGE-BECS Yes Yes Yes
MERGE (U.S.) MERGE Optimistic Yes Yes No 10 2030 2050 Intertemporal optimization Blanford et al.
(2009-this issue)MERGE Pessimistic Yes Yes No
MESSAGE (E.U.) MESSAGE Yes Yes Yes 10 2030 2050 Intertemporal optimization
and dynamic recursive
Krey and Riahi
(2009-this issue)MESSAGE-NoBECS Yes Yes No
MiniCAM (U.S.) MiniCAM-Base Yes Yes Yes 15 2035 2050 Recursive dynamic Calvin et al.
(2009a-this issue)MiniCAM-LoTech Yes No No
POLES (E.U.) One Version Yes Yes Yes 1 2030 2050 Recursive dynamic Russ et al.
(2009-this issue)
SGM (U.S.) One Version Yes Yes No 5 2026 2046 Recursive dynamic Calvin et al.
(2009b-this issue)
WITCH (E.U.) One Version Yes Yes No 5 2025 2045 Intertemporal optimization Bosetti et al.
(2009-this issue)
The table also speciﬁes each model's key energy supply technologies, time periods used to represent delayed participation, intertemporal solution approach, and corresponding
paper in this volume.
Table 3
Comparison of different metrics of climate change and GHG concentrations for the three Kyoto concentration targets in the EMF 22 International Scenarios.
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(W/m2) (ppmv) (ppmv) (W/m2) (ppmv) (°C) (°C) (°C)
2.6 450 355–415 23–2.7 427–460 1.2–1.5 1.9–2.2 2.8–3.3
3.7 550 425–484 3.5–3.8 535–566 1.9–2.1 2.8–3.1 4.3–4.6
4.5 650 501–545 4.2–4.5 610–645 2.3–2.4 3.4–3.6 5.1–5.5
“CS” refers to the equilibrium climate sensitivity. Total forcing and associated CO2-e concentrations are from the three participating models with the most detailed endogenous
representations of total forcing: IMAGE, MESSAGE, and MiniCAM (van Vliet et al., 2009-this issue; Krey and Riahi, 2009-this issue; Calvin et al., 2009a-this issue). The relationship
between equilibrium temperature and total forcing is based on Meehl et al. (2007, Section 10.7 and Table 10.8).
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(as opposed to Kyoto forcing) in 2100 from the three participating
models with the most detailed endogenous representations of the non-
Kyoto emissions that determine total forcing (IMAGE, MESSAGE, and
MiniCAM).4 Total forcing includes the impact of additional substances
and factors, beyond the Kyoto gases, that affect the Earth's radiative
balance such as the Montreal gases, tropospheric and stratospheric
ozone, surface albedo change and, in particular, aerosols — mostly4 IMAGE, MESSAGE, and MiniCAM are three of the four models producing
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) process through the Integrated
Assessment Modeling Consortium (IAMC). The fourth model is AIM. The RCPs are
part of a process in which climate and IA modelers will work in parallel toward the
generation of new integrated scenarios of climate change to support the IPCC's Fifth
Assessment Report. The selection of the four RCP models is documented in Moss et al.
(2008).sulfate, black carbon, and organic carbon. Total forcing is a more
complete representation of the full anthropogenic effect on the Earth's
radiative balance than Kyoto forcing, and therefore a better indicator of
potential climate change.
Across the three targets, total forcing from the three models
converges to a level close to Kyoto-only forcing by 2100. This
convergence represents a marked change from the present. As of
2005, total forcing was roughly 1.6 W/m2 or about 375 ppmv CO2-e
(Forster et al., 2007), and Kyoto-only forcing was roughly 2.3 W/m2 or
430 ppmv CO2-e. A full discussion of the reasons for this convergence
and the implications for meeting particular climate-action cases is
provided in Section 4.3. Here we note only that the convergence
between these metrics means that, over the long-term, Kyoto-only
forcing is roughly consistent with total forcing.
The ﬁnal two columns of Table 3 show the long-term equilibrium
temperature increase that would result if global Kyoto concentrations
were tobeheldover the long-termat the targets in this study.A2 °C long-
Fig. 1. The delayed participation architecture explored in EMF 22 International Scenarios.
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trations are stabilized over the long-term at 450 ppmv CO2-e or below.
The Intergovernmental Panel onClimateChange (IPCC)argues that 3 °C is
the most likely climate sensitivity, and that climate sensitivity lies in the
interval of 2 °C to 4.5 °C with a probability of greater than 66% (Meehl et
al., 2007). Research has indicated enormous uncertainty in climate sensi-
tivity. Some estimates have put the 90%conﬁdence interval at between
1 °C andover 9 °C (Meehl et al., 2007). A2 °C long-term target canonly be
reachedwith a long-term concentration of 550 ppmvCO2-e if the climate
sensitivity is at the low end of the IPCC range (climate sensitivity of 2 °C).
The relationship between the Kyoto-only CO2-e concentration targets
and temperature increase needs to be qualiﬁed in three important ways.
First, the actual, or transient, temperature lags the equilibrium temper-
ature due to the long time scale of the ocean temperature response to
changingatmospheric concentrations. The transient temperature increase
may lag the equilibrium temperature by 0.5 °C ormore depending on the
scenario, and convergence between the two may take many centuries.
Hence, it is possible to keep the temperature increase below, say, a 2 °C
target while still temporarily exceeding the corresponding equilibrium
CO2-e concentration. Second, the EMF 22 International Scenarios only
consider the period up to 2100. Concentrations could increase or decrease
after 2100 depending on mitigation efforts beyond 2100. Finally, in the
overshoot scenarios, it is possible for temperatures to exceed the long-
term equilibrium level prior to 2100 if concentrations exceed the long-
term targets for a sufﬁcient period over the century. The temperature
implications of the scenarios are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.
2.4. Overshoot and not-to-exceed scenarios
The second dimension by which the climate-action cases are
differentiated is whether the concentration target can be exceeded in
this century. Recall that the concentration targets must be met in
2100. There are two formulations used in this study. In the not-to-
exceed formulation, the concentration target cannot be exceeded
prior to 2100. In, contrast, in the overshoot formulation, concentra-
tions can exceed the 2100 target at any time during the century as
long as the target is met in 2100. This overshoot option provides
greater near-term ﬂexibility to meet targets. However, if overshoot
occurs, it requires greater action later in the century than a not-to-
exceed formulation, and it is possible that temperatures could exceed
those associated with long-term equilibrium levels prior to 2100.
2.5. Degrees of international participation in climate mitigation
Thedegree andnature of near-term international action onmitigation
is at the core of the EMF 22 International Scenarios. Two possible
international policy architectures are explored in this study. The full
participation architecture assumes that all countries begin emissions
reductions, in a coordinated fashion, in 2012 and that mitigation is
undertaken where it is least costly; that is, the marginal costs of
abatement are equalized across regions. The full participation formulation
is an idealized best-case that, although unrealistic, provides a useful
benchmark for understanding the inﬂuence of less-than-comprehensive
climate action. It provides a ﬂoor on total global mitigation costs.
A more realistic future than the full participation formulation is
that countries will take on differentiated responsibilities, with some
regions, most likely the developed regions, taking on more mitigation
initially than other regions. Hence, the EMF 22 International Scenarios
also explore a delayed participation scenario in which the majority of
the developed regions begin mitigation as a group in 2012 (Group 1)
and the remaining regions (Group 2 and Group 3) enter at different
points in the future (Fig. 1). To be clear, the formulation of delayed
participation in this study is a single, representative case intended to5 The climate sensitivity characterizes the global mean equilibrium temperature
response to a doubling of CO2-e concentrations.gain insights into the effects of delayed participation. It is not intended
to mirror speciﬁc real-world policy proposals, which may, for
example, be based not on the absence of action in Groups 2 and 3,
but on differentiated levels of action among regions and countries.
Group 1 includes the Annex 1 countries minus Russia; this roughly
corresponds to the OECD. This group begins mitigation in 2012 and
serves as the initial coalition for action on climate. It is assumed that
all countries in this coalition see the same price on carbon so that
marginal costs are equalized across countries in the coalition. This
could be achieved through a carbon tax or a tradable permit scheme.
The precise mechanism is left unspeciﬁed.
Group 2 consists of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (or BRICs). Group
2 begins mitigation in 2030. Group 2 does not begin mitigation at the
going carbon price in Group 1, but instead begins at a lower pricewhich
rises gradually over 20 years until, in 2050, Group 2 is at the same price
level as Group 1. Group 2's initial carbon price (in 2030) is set equal to
Group 1's 2012 price; that is, Group 2 enters under the same conditions
asGroup1. Group 3, consisting of the remainingNon-Annex 1 countries,
enters in 2050, again at Group 1's initial price, which, as with Group 2,
gradually rises to the Group 1 and Group 2 price by 2070.
The speciﬁcation of the delayed participation formulationwas broad
enough to allow for some differences in interpretation by the modeling
teams, and thesedifferences in interpretation led todifferences inmodel
behavior. First, modeling groups differed mechanically in terms of the
precise model periods in which Group 2 and Group 3 experienced their
ﬁrst carbonprice. For example,manyof themodels interpreted the2030
entry date for Group 2 (BRICs) to mean that the initial carbon price
shouldbeapplied toGroup2 in the2030model period. In contrast, other
modelers chose to employ a zero carbon price in the 2030model period
and to apply the initial carbon price in the followingmodel period. This
means that the onset of mitigation in one set of models was one model
period earlier than in the other set. Table 2 provides information on the
last model periods in which Group 2 and Group 3 did not experience a
carbon price.
A seconddifference in the interpretation of the delayed participation
regime is that many of the models did not include deﬁnitions of world
regions that exactly matched the regional deﬁnitions in the delayed
participation formulation. For example,manymodels do not have Brazil
or Russia as separate regions. These models might, for example, use
LatinAmerica to represent Brazil or the former SovietUnion to represent
Russia. Or they might include Brazil in Group 3 instead of Group 2. The
useof regional structures thatdiffer fromtheprecise regional deﬁnitions
for this study could make the delayed participation scenarios more or
less difﬁcult than they would if precise regional representations were
possible, depending on whether mitigation for particular countries is
pushed backward or forward in time. However, given that mostmodels
have effective coverage of the Annex 1 regions, Russia, India, and China,
this difference between study and model regions did not create large
differences in the implications of the scenarios across models.
Finally, the delayed participation formulation requires that no
mitigation be taken prior to accession, even in anticipation of later
action. Many of themodels participating in this study are intertemporally
optimizing models, meaning that these models endogenously allocate
emissions reductions over time in away thatwould bemost economically
efﬁcient. In these models, non-participating regions would otherwise
Fig. 2. CO2-e concentrations of the Kyoto gases across the EMF 22 reference scenarios.
Table 4
The scenarios submitted by the participating modeling teams.
The “+”means that the team was able to produce the scenario; darkened cells with an “X”mean that the team was not able to produce the scenario. “N/A”means that the scenario was
not attempted with the given model or model version.
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in non-emitting capital prior to accession, leading to early mitigation.
Because the formulation speciﬁcally called for no mitigation prior to
accession, many of these modelers simply held non-participating region
emissions at their reference scenario value. This approach limits the
opportunities to explore emissions leakage. On the other hand, if fully
implemented, the intertemporal solution approach can beused to explore
the implications of countries' anticipation of future climate agreements.
Several models explored this issue through sensitivity analysis from the
core climate-action cases (Blanford et al., 2009-this issue; Bosetti et al.,
2009-this issue), and these are discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.
Two ﬁnal points should be kept in mind in interpreting the delayed
participation architecture in this study. First, although the delayed
participation architecture introduces substantial inefﬁciencies through
the delayed mitigation of many countries, it assumes cost-effective
mitigation in those countries that are part of the coalition. Real-world
policies may include inefﬁciencies even within coalitions of participat-
ing countries. Second, it should be emphasized that the delayed
participation formulation eventually becomes a full-participation
scenario — by 2070. The difference between the two international
architectures in the EMF 22 International Scenarios is the time until full
participation is achieved. Ultimately, full participation is necessary to
stabilize GHG concentrations.
3. Study results: an overview of the scenarios
All modeling teams participating in the EMF 22 International
Scenarios were required to attempt to produce scenarios for all ten
climate-action cases. However, no team succeeded in producing
scenarios for all ten. Modelers were instructed that they were not
required to submit scenarios representing particular climate-action
cases if at least one of the following conditions was met:
• Physical infeasibility: The climate-action case was physically infeasi-
ble according to the model because the radiative forcing target was
exceeded prior to the initiation of mitigation in Group 2 (BRICs) and
Group 3 (the Non-Annex 1 countries).
• Model solution: The model could not be solved for the particular
climate-action case, which could be due to failures in the solution
mechanismat higher CO2 prices, decline or expansion constraints that
hold back the rate of change in key sectors such as energy, or CO2 price
limits in model.• High initial price:Modelerswere requestednot toproduce scenarios if
the initial carbon price in Group 1 exceeded $1000/tCO2 in 2012.
Table 4 shows the scenarios produced for this study. Unfortunate-
ly, methodological issues prevented precise identiﬁcation of the
obstacles to producing particular scenarios. For example, if modelers
chose to stop searching for the solution to a particular climate-action
case because the initial carbon price exceeded the threshold, the case
may ultimately have been physically infeasible or the model may not
have been able to ﬁnd a solution.
Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some conclusions regarding the
reasons that particular cases were not produced. First, physical
infeasibility was only applicable to not-to-exceed scenarios. To take
an extreme example, the ﬂexibility provided by the option to
overshoot would generally allow targets to be met by 2100 if all
emissions were eliminated from regions immediately after they began
taking on emissions reductions. Further, with the possible exception
of the not-to-exceed 450 ppmv CO2-e target, physical infeasibility was
relevant only to delayed participation climate-action cases.
In general, Table 4 conﬁrms expectations about the difﬁculty of
particular targets. The difﬁculty increases as the constraint is tightened,
as the globe deviates from full participation, and as the ability to
overshoot targets is restricted. More speciﬁcally, delayed participation
Fig. 3. Global emissions from fossil and industrial sources in 2050 across scenarios participating in this study.
6 Note that this result is also a function of differences in the approach to the
allocation of emissions across regions and over time in the delayed participation
climate-action cases. Several modeling groups used identical global pathways with full
and delayed participation.
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physically infeasible if concentrations are not allowed to temporarily
exceed their long-term targets.
The CO2-e concentrations emerging from the reference scenarios
(Fig. 2) provide insight into the relative challenges of the climate-action
cases. In all the reference scenarios, the 450 ppmv CO2-e target was
exceededwithin a decade (i.e., prior to 2020). The associated stringency
was the reason that no model was able to produce the not-to-exceed
450 ppmv CO2-e case with delayed participation. On the other hand,
eight of 14models were able to produce the overshoot 450 ppmv CO2-e
case with full participation.
The availability of bioenergy coupled with CCS (bioCCS) had an
inﬂuence on which models could represent this case (compare
Tables 2 and 4), as did other factors, such as reference case emissions
levels. Only one model with bioCCS was unable to represent the
overshoot 450 ppmv CO2-e case with full participation. At the same
time, a number of models without bioCCS were able to produce this
case, reinforcing the notion that the negative emissions from bioCCS
are not the only means to meet overshoot targets. Only two models
were able to produce the remaining 450 ppmv CO2-e cases: not-to-
exceed with full participation and overshoot with delayed participa-
tion. Both of these models included the option for bioCCS.
It is important to note that the not-to-exceed formulation for the
450 ppmv CO2-e scenarios could have different characteristics if the
target were based on total radiative forcing rather than Kyoto-only
radiative forcing. Because total forcing is noticeably lower than Kyoto-
only forcing today, there is potentially greaterhead roomtomeetnot-to-
exceed targets. However, because this head room is largely the result of
negative forcing fromaerosol emissions,which are coincidentwith fossil
fuel combustion (they are also associated with other environmental
problems), CO2 abatementwould result in decreased aerosol emissions.
The reduction would bring Kyoto and total forcing closer together. The
effect of the additional head room on meeting tight, not-to-exceed
targets is therefore ambiguous.
The 550 ppmvCO2-e climate action cases are, not surprisingly, easier
for the models to represent with the exception of the not-to-exceed
scenario with delayed participation. This is consistent with reference
emissions acrossmodels exceeding 550 ppmv CO2-e between 2030 and
2045. The concentration target is tight enough that delays of the sort
explored in this studywouldmake it difﬁcult to stay below it. Finally, allmodels were able to represent the 650 ppmv CO2-e climate action
scenarios. Reference concentrations do not exceed 650 ppmv CO2-e
until aroundmid-century, leaving a great deal of ﬂexibility to meet this
target, even with delays by the developing regions.
The inability of a particular model to produce a scenario does not
necessarilymean that the scenario is infeasible.Model solution issues and
high initial carbonprices in particular are a function of the assumptions of
themodel. For example, modeling groupswho assumedmore aggressive
technology options (e.g., cheaper energy technologies, the option for
bioCCS) found lower carbon prices and less pressure on the solution
mechanisms of the models. Where climate-action cases could not be
modeled solely for model solution or high initial price reasons, this is an
indication of particularly high rates of change in the energy and other
climate-related sectors, which may prove politically difﬁcult to produce,
but does not imply a lack of physical feasibility. Climate-action cases that
were not modeled due to physical infeasibility — the radiative forcing
target was exceeded prior to the onset of mitigation by all of the world's
regions — make a stronger statement about the challenge of these
particular climate-action cases. However, even here, modeling assump-
tions, particularly those concerning emissions growth in Groups 2 and 3,
were partially responsible for the outcome. Not surprisingly, models that
assumed greater growth in these regions or models that delayed
participation longer had a lower chance of meeting a given target.
4. Emissions, concentrations, and temperature across the scenarios
4.1. Global emissions
Fig. 3 shows the change in global CO2 (not CO2-e) emissions
relative to 2000 in 2050 across all the EMF 22 International Scenarios.
Note that the ﬁgure also shows which scenarios were attempted but
not completed for each climate-action case. Consistent with intuition,
the reductions increase with the stringency of the target. Delay has a
limited impact on global emissions, but generally leads to slightly
higher global emissions in 2050 relative to similar cases without
delay.6 (The impact on regional emissions is discussed in Section 4.2.)
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generally increases emissions in 2050 relative to similar scenarios
under a not-to-exceed formulation. It is important to note, however,
that less aggressive reductions up to 2050 resulting from delayed
participation and from overshoot lead to greater reductions beyond
2050. We return to this point later.
One reason for the range in global reductions amongmodels for any
climate-action case is land use uptake or emissions. The FUND
scenarios include a terrestrial biosphere feedback that increases
terrestrial emissions as concentrations increase. For example, in the
not-to-exceed 650 ppmv CO2-e scenario with full participation, global
industrial emissions are 22 GtCO2 in 2050 with the feedback; without
the feedback, emissions are 38 GtCO2. That is, the feedback forces a
further emissions reduction of 16 GtCO2 (Tol, 2009-this issue). To
meet any given target, lower fossil and industrial emissions are
required in the presence of the feedback. In contrast, the GTEM
scenario assumes land use uptake that ranges from 2GtCO2/yr tomore
than 7GtCO2/yr (Gurney et al., 2009-this issue). Hence, the fossil and
industrial emissions from FUND tend to be on the low side of the range
across scenarios and those from GTEM tend to be on the high side.
A second factor is variation in the degree towhich long-term targets
are temporarily exceeded in those scenarios that allow for overshoot. As
an example, Fig. 4 shows the emissions and CO2-e concentration
pathways in the 450 ppmv CO2-e scenarios. Although the long-term
target is 450 ppmv CO2-e, concentrations in ﬁve of the models exceed
500 ppmvCO2-eprior to 2100. Because these scenarios allow for greater
overshoot, they tend to have higher emissions in 2050 than those
scenarios with less aggressive overshoot.
Negative fossil and industrial emissions through the use of bioCCS
technology are not required for overshoot pathways. Overshoot can be
achieved without negative emissions by taking advantage of the delays
in the carbon cycle; that is, the physical process for removing CO2 from
the atmosphere. For example the MESSAGE-NoBECS scenario still
overshoots the long-term target signiﬁcantly in Fig. 4. To achieve this
degree of overshoot, however, fossil and industrial emissions must be
reduced far more substantially in the near term than if bioCCS were
available to bring emissions belowzero in the secondhalf of the century.Fig. 4. Global CO2 emissions and CO2-e concentrations in thThe overshoot scenarios are something of a conundrum for
negotiators and policy makers (Kheshgi et al., 2005; Wigley et al.,
2007; den Elzen and van Vuuren, 2007; Clarke et al., 2009). On the one
hand, they allow for greater ﬂexibility to gradually reduce emissions
over the coming decades while still allowing the world to reach more
aggressive climate-related targets in the long run. Indeed, the notion
of overshoot raises the possibility that concentrations could continue
falling beyond 2100 if the world continues abatement into the next
century. On the other hand, overshoot scenarios raise some very
serious concerns. Taking advantage of near-term ﬂexibility requires
more aggressive action in the second-half of the century. Indeed, the
scenarios that take greatest advantage of overshoot have the lowest
emissions in the second-half of the century; and some of these
scenarios are based on negative global emissions beyond 2050
through extensive use of bioCCS. If policy makers commit to
aggressive climate-related targets based on overshoot pathways,
they can relax actions today, but they are depending on potentially
very aggressive measures in the second-half of the century —
measures that need to be implemented long after many of these
policy makers have left ofﬁce.
In addition, overshoot scenarios can lead to larger near-term
changes in climate than not-to-exceed scenarios. Note that the high-
end of the range of mid-century GHG concentrations in the overshoot
450 ppmv CO2-e full participation scenarios reaches almost 600 ppmv
CO2-e in 2050, and there are four scenarios in which concentrations
exceed 500 ppmv CO2-e in 2050. The temperature implications of
overshoot are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3. Here we note
only that given the thermal lags in the climate system, the increase in
temperature remains below 2 °C this century in all but one of the
450 ppmv CO2-e overshoot scenarios, assuming the IPCC's most likely
climate sensitivity of 3 °C.
Referring back to Fig. 3, the difﬁculty of achieving 450 ppmv CO2-e
is evident from the emissions reductions in 2050. In the most ﬂexible
scenario — full participation with overshoot — only 8 of the fourteen
models that attempted the scenario were able to complete the
scenario under the requirements of the study. In addition, if the GTEM
scenario (which includes the greatest terrestrial uptake and thee overshoot 450 CO2-e scenarios with full participation.
Fig. 5. Group 2+3 emissions plotted against Group 1 emissions in 2050 across the not-to-exceed scenarios (left panel) and the overshoot scenarios (right panel).
7 See footnote 6.
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(which includes the most aggressive negative emissions in the second
half of the century) are excluded from the discussion, then global
emissions reductions in 2050 relative to 2000 range from 60% to
almost 100%. Global emissions reductions weremore than 60% in both
models that were able to produce the overshoot 450 ppmv CO2-e
speciﬁcation with delayed participation; and reductions were almost
100% below 2000 levels for the not-to-exceed 450 ppmv CO2-e
scenario with full participation. In contrast, emissions in the
550 ppmv CO2-e scenarios, although varying across scenarios and
models, roughly cluster around or slightly below 2000 emissions
levels. The 650 ppmv CO2-e scenarios generally allow for robust
increases in global emissions up to 2050.
4.2. The distribution of emissions reductions across regions
Fig. 5 shows global the distribution of emissions reductions across
study regions in 2050 and across scenarios. Groups 2 and 3 are
combined in the ﬁgure to represent the non-Annex 1 regions plus
Russia; Group 1 represents the Annex 1 regions absent Russia. The left
panel of Fig. 6 shows emissions combinations from not-to-exceed
scenarios, and the right panel shows emissions combinations for
overshoot cases.
The scatter of emissions mitigation combinations tends to slope
from upper right to lower left as the concentration target becomes
more stringent, a reﬂection of the fact that emissions decline for all
groups as the constraint becomesmore stringent. The 450 ppmvCO2-e
scenarios are in the lower left corner of the ﬁgure, and the 550 ppmv
CO2-e and 650 ppmv CO2-e scenarios are distributed upward and to
the right. There is a clear increase in emissions in the overshoot cases
relative to the not-to-exceed cases, as overshoot allows increased
emissions prior to the end of the century.
Fig. 5 also contains information about combinations of emissions
between Group 1 and Groups 2 and 3 which are equivalent — the
green “iso-global-emissions” lines. These lines slope from upper left to
lower right, reﬂecting the fact that as emissions in Group 1 increase,
emissions in the sum of Groups 2 and 3 must decrease to keep total
global emissions constant. In general, the delayed participation doesnot dramatically alter global emissions in 2050. Instead, delay causes a
shift in the distribution of emissions among regions in 2050, an
upward and leftward shift along the constant global emissions lines in
Fig. 5.7
This zero-sum character of the 2050 reductions has important
implications for the use of international offsets to meet domestic
emissions targets. If the developed countries purchase international
offsets from the developing countries in order to lessen the actual
physical mitigation requirement in the developed countries, then
more total emissions reductionmust be undertaken in the developing
regions to meet that same long-term target. In other words, the
reductions that one country pays for, through its own mitigation and
through purchases of offsets in other regions, cannot be confusedwith
the actual physical reductions in that country.
As an example, let us consider the not-to-exceed 550 ppmv CO2-e
scenarios. In general, these scenarios cluster around roughly 2000-
level emissions in 2050 to a 50% decrease below 2000 levels. Let us
consider the case of a 25% decrease below 2000 levels. If Group 1 were
to undertake an 80% reduction below 2000 levels, then Group 2 and 3
together would be able to increase emissions to roughly 30% above
2000 levels. If, on the other hand, through international offsets, Group
1 were to purchase emissions reductions in Group 2 and Group 3 and
to only undertake roughly 40% reductions domestically, then Groups 2
and 3 would, together, need to reduce emissions to about 10% below
2000 levels in 2050.
4.3. The full-forcing and temperature implications of the scenarios
Temperature has become a common currency for conversation
regarding long-term climate-related goals. It is therefore useful to
roughly outline the relationship between the scenarios in this study,
which were constructed based on Kyoto-only forcing metrics, and
temperature change. Because the study did not speciﬁcally address
temperature and temperature goals, it did not produce a highly robust
set of analyses for exploring temperature. Nonetheless, many of the
Fig. 6. CO2-e concentrations of Kyoto GHGs and all forcing agents from selected models (IMAGE, MESSAGE, MiniCAM) for the overshoot 450 ppmv CO2-e scenario and the not-to-
exceed 550 ppmv CO2-e scenario under full participation. The 90% conﬁdence interval for 2005 Kyoto forcing is+21 and−20 ppmv CO2-e; the 90% conﬁdence interval for 2005 total
forcing is +61 and −64 ppmv CO2-e (Forster et al. 2007).
S72 L. Clarke et al. / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S64–S81models in the study are capable of commenting on the full-gas forcing
and temperature implications of the scenarios, and several salient
observations emerge from this work. Here we brieﬂy highlight three
observations froma reviewof a subset of themodels participating in the
study. The models chosen for this comparison— IMAGE, MESSAGE, and
MiniCAM — have the most detailed endogenous representations of the
non-Kyoto emissions that determine total forcing.8
First, in the long-run, for this subset of models, Kyoto-only and
total forcing are roughly equivalent metrics. Fig. 6 shows the
relationship between Kyoto-only forcing and total forcing across
these models for two of the climate-action cases. The difference
between Kyoto-only CO2-e equivalent concentration and full gas CO2-
e concentrationwas approximately 55 ppmv CO2-e in 2005 (Forster et
al., 2007). In the climate-action scenarios, the difference between the
two versions of CO2-e concentration closes considerably over time in
the models, particularly in the more stringent climate-action cases. In
2100, total forcing ranges from roughly 10 ppmv CO2-e above Kyoto
forcing in the MESSAGE-NoBECS 450 ppmv CO2-e scenario to roughly
25 ppmv CO2-e below Kyoto forcing in the MiniCAM 550 ppmv CO2-e
scenarios. This convergence, and the general lack of bias in the
relationship between the two forcing metrics, suggests that there
would be minimal difference between long-term results if the long-8 See Footnote 4.term targets in the EMF 22 International Scenarios had been speciﬁed
in total forcing rather than Kyoto-only forcing. The difference
between the two is negligible compared to other uncertainties that
are relevant over the 100-year time horizon of the study.
There are several reasons for the convergence between the total
forcing and Kyoto forcing. Many non-Kyoto, long-lived GHGs are
regulated under the Montreal Protocol and therefore will largely be
phased out by 2010 (CFCs and other gases) and 2040 (HCFCs) (UNEP
Ozone Secretariat, 2006). Aerosol emissions are also strongly reduced as
a co-beneﬁt of GHG mitigation, since they occur in combustion
processes of fossil fuels as well as traditional biomass. In addition,
because aerosols are local pollutants with numerous adverse environ-
mental andhealth effects (Smith andHaigler, 2008), they are likely tobe
reduced in the medium-term because of increasingly stringent air
pollution legislation (e.g. Cofala et al., 2007). However, it should be
emphasized that there is no strict physical linkbetween theemissionsof
the different substances; for example, reduction of local air pollutants
can be achieved without GHG mitigation, while some biofuels would
increase emissions of such air pollutants.
Although there is convergence between Kyoto-only and total
forcing in the long term, there are signiﬁcant short-term differences
between the two, and these are particularly relevant to the challenge
of meeting the not-to-exceed 450 ppmv CO2-e scenario. On the one
hand, with a lower initial CO2-e concentration, the not-to-exceed
450 ppmv CO2-e target would initially appear easier to meet if the
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the other hand, in case of very rapid mitigation that is required to stay
below 450 ppmv CO2-e in either of the two radiative forcing
deﬁnitions, the decrease of aerosol emissions as a by-product of
GHG mitigation would induce a strong increase of total radiative
forcing, because aerosol cooling ceases almost immediately (Smith
et al., 2000; Smith andWigley, 2006; Krey and Riahi, 2009-this issue).
Hence, it is not possible to determine, without further analysis, how
the use of a total forcing metric would alter the conclusions for the
not-to-exceed 450 ppmv CO2-e scenario in this study.
The second important observation is that transient temperature
change lags equilibrium temperature change, with implications for
the challenge of meeting particular temperature goals. The lag is due
to the long time scales involved in such climate feedback mechanisms
as ice-albedo and ocean thermal inertia. For example, in the overshoot
450 ppmv CO2-e cases and the not-to-exceed 550 ppmv CO2-e cases,
both with full participation, the transient temperature change lags
the steady-state equilibrium temperature change by 0.5 °C or more
throughout the century, assuming a climate sensitivity of 3 °C (Fig. 7).
The practical implication is that, under a climate sensitivity of 3 °C,
overshoot scenarios leading to 450 ppmv CO2-e Kyoto are consistent
with limiting the increase in transient temperature to 2 °C, as long as
the overshoot is limited. Indeed, end-of-century concentrations
slightly above 450 ppmv CO2-e might also be consistent with a 2 °C
target, particularly if overshoot over the course of the century is
limited. A 550 ppmv CO2-e goal is not consistent with limiting the
increase in temperature to 2 °C at a climate sensitivity of 3 °C.
However, end-of-century targets well in excess of 550 ppmv CO2-e
are consistent with limiting the temperature increase to 3 °C or less if
climate sensitivity is 3 °C. Of course, in all cases, continued mitigation
beyond 2100 is necessary tomaintain temperatures below these long-
term targets: the scenarios demonstrate that the global economy will
need to be almost fully decarbonized by 2100, andmitigation policy isFig. 7. Transient temperature increase in the overshoot 450 ppmv CO2-e and not-to-exceed 5
3 °C from selected models (IMAGE, MESSAGE, and MiniCAM). The 90% conﬁdence intervalneeded post-2100 to prevent the market from switching back to fossil
fuels.
Finally, there is tremendous uncertainty surrounding climate
sensitivity, the most fundamental factor linking the scenarios in this
paper to temperature-related goals. Hence, linking the scenarios to
speciﬁc temperature pathways based on speciﬁc estimates of climate
sensitivity may be wholly inconsistent with a risk management
approach to climate mitigation. The discussion of global temperature
increase thus far has been based on a climate sensitivity of 3 °C, which
was consideredmost likely by the IPCC. Due to the large uncertainty of
climate sensitivity, a comparison of single climate model runs is not
sufﬁcient to capture the scenario characteristics with respect to
temperature change; rather, probabilistic assessment is needed (den
Elzen and van Vuuren, 2007; Keppo et al., 2007; Meinshausen, 2006;
Meinshausen et al., 2009; Schneider and Mastrandrea, 2005). Krey
and Riahi (2009-this issue) explored the probabilistic temperature
implications of the scenarios from IMAGE, MESSAGE and MiniCAM.
The probability of staying below a temperature target over the course
of the century is shown in the left-hand panel of Fig. 8 for the
overshoot 450 ppmv CO2-e scenarios with full participation from the
three models. Based on the uniform prior climate sensitivity
probability density function from Forest et al. (2002), the authors
ﬁnd that the probability of staying below 2 °C over the course of the
21st century varies enormously, between about 25% and 75% (Fig. 8).
The range of likelihoods for staying below a temperature target turns
out to be much narrower in the not-to-exceed 550 ppmv CO2-e
scenarios. The large variation can be traced to the degree of overshoot
in the scenarios, which is strongly linked to cumulative GHG
emissions until 2050, as shown by Meinshausen et al. (2009). The
right-hand panel of Fig. 8 displays the probability of staying below
a 2 °C temperature increase until 2100 for the overshoot 450 ppmv
CO2-e scenarios with full participation. A range of probability
estimates are shown, based on 12 probability density functions from50 ppmv CO2-e scenarios, both under full participation and with a climate sensitivity of
for temperature rise in 2005 is ±0.19 °C (Trenberth et al. 2007).
Fig. 8. Probabilistic temperature implications of the overshoot 450 ppmv CO2-e scenarios with full participation from selected models (from Krey and Riahi, 2009-this issue). The left
panel shows the probability of staying below speciﬁc temperatures at any time over the course of the century across selected models (IMAGE, MESSAGE, and MiniCAM). The
probability is based on the uniform prior climate sensitivity probability density function from Forest et al. (2002). The right panel shows the probability of staying below a 2 °C
temperature increase as a function of peak CO2-e concentration (total forcing). The highlighted probability is based on Forest et al. (2002), and the error bars represent the range of
probabilities based on 12 probability density functions from the literature (for more details, see Krey and Riahi, 2009-this issue). (Note that the reported full gas forcing was derived
using MAGICC 4.1 and therefore might differ from that reported by the native climate components of the selected models [for more detailes, see Krey and Riahi, 2009-this issue]).
Fig. 9. Reference global primary energy consumption across EMF 22 scenarios. Note that
nuclear and non-biomass renewable energy sources are expressed in fossil-equivalent
primary energy consumption based on a conversion factor of 0.4.
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total CO2-e concentration, which turns out to be a good proxy for
estimating the likelihood of staying below 2 °C over the course of the
century.
5. Energy system transitions
The energy system is the primary source of anthropogenic GHG
emissions. A dramatic transformation in the way that human societies
produce and use energy will therefore be core to any efforts to
stabilize atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. At some point, all
scenarios lead toward zero emissions and an associated reduction in
freely-emitting fossil-based energy. The timing of this transformation
depends on the stringency of the climate-related target.
Thereare twooptions for reducingemissions from theenergy sector:
(1) reducing energy consumption and (2) substituting from freely-
emitting fossil energy to low-emissions sources: nuclear energy, fossil
energy with CCS, bioenergy (with and without CCS), and non-biomass
renewable energy such aswind power and solar power. Primary energy
consumption in the reference scenarios (Fig. 9) sets the scale for the
degree to which these two options must be deployed. All other things
being equal, higher reference energy consumption leads to higher
mitigation and mitigation costs in the climate-action cases, greater
production from low- or negative-emissions sources, and larger
reductions in energy consumption from the reference. More broadly,
higher energy consumption in the reference makes reaching any
concentration target more difﬁcult. For example, reference energy
consumption is in the upper half of the distribution for all of themodels
that could not provide not-to-exceed 550 ppmv CO2-e scenarios with
delayed participation (GTEM, MERGE Optimistic, MESSAGE, MiniCAM-
Base, MiniCAM-LoTech, and Poles).
All of the EMF 22 scenarios are associated with increased annual
primary energy consumption over the century. By 2100, annual primary
energy consumption ranges from more than a doubling from today's
levels (≈1100 EJ/yr) in the lowest primary energy future— theMERGE
Pessimistic reference scenario, which is based on severe recession
followed by low growth post-recovery — to almost quadruple today's
levels (≈1900 EJ/yr).The requirement for low-carbon energy and energy use reductions
is simply the difference between reference energy and the energy that
can still be supplied by freely-emitting fossil fuels while still
maintaining a course toward long-term concentration goals. Unlike
reference primary energy, which varies dramatically across models,
depending in large part on economic growth, the freely-emitting fossil
energy consumption is largely constrained by the degree of emissions
reductions (Fig. 10). Hence, the relationship between freely-emitting
fossil energy and emissions reductions is roughly linear across the full
set of scenarios. Variations in freely-emitting fossil energy for any
given degree of emissions reductions are due in large part to
differences among models in the degree of fuel switching among
fossil sources and the presence or absence of the option for bioCCS,
which allows for greater consumption of freely-emitting fossil energy
for a given level of CO2 emissions.
Fig. 10. Consumption of freely-emitting fossil energy across scenarios, 2030 (left panel) and 2050 (right panel), plotted against CO2 emissions reductions relative to 2000 levels.
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energy and energy reduction are subtracted from reference energy
consumption. Consistent with intuition, the tighter constraints are
associated with greater emissions reductions, and greater emissionsFig. 11. Production of low-carbon energy across scenarios, 2030 (left panel) and 2050 (righ
non-biomass renewable energy sources expressed in fossil-equivalent primary energy consreductions are associated with greater production from low- and
negative-emissions sources (Fig. 11).
The production of low-carbon primary energy in these scenarios
demonstrates the scale of the challenge presented by the climate-actiont panel), plotted against CO2 emissions reductions relative to 2000 levels. Nuclear and
umption based on a conversion factor of 0.4.
Fig. 12. Production of low-carbon energy across scenarios, 2030 (left panel) and 2050 (right panel), plotted against primary energy production. Nuclear and non-biomass renewable
energy sources expressed in fossil-equivalent primary energy consumption based on a conversion factor of 0.4.
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sources (converted here to fossil-equivalent and excluding traditional
biomass) stood at roughly 75 EJ/yr. In 2030, production from low-
emissions sources in the EMF 22 International Scenarios ranges from
200 EJ/yr to 600 EJ/yr for the 450 ppmv CO2-e scenarios; that is a range
of slightly less than triple 2005 levels to an eight-fold increase.
Consumption in the 550 ppmv CO2-e scenarios ranges from 100 EJ/yr
toover 300 EJ/yr. In 2050, production from low-emission sources ranges
from 500 EJ/yr to almost 1200 EJ/yr in the 450 ppmv CO2-e scenarios
and from 200 EJ/yr to over 900 EJ/yr in the 550 ppmv CO2-e scenarios.
These representmassive ramp-ups in the scale of low-emissions energy
production, and a marked departure from recent trends.
As an illustration of the extent of the changes implied by the more
aggressive scenarios, the MiniCAM not-to-exceed 450 ppmv CO2-e
scenario with full participation included 500 new 1000 MW nuclear
reactors by 2020 along with the storage of 20 billion tonnes of CO2
(Calvin et al., 2009a-this issue). The overshoot 450 ppmv CO2-e
scenario with full participation included 126 new 1000 MW nuclear
reactors by 2020 alongwith the capture of nearly one billion tonnes of
CO2.
Consumption of low-emissions energy is a function not just of the
degree of emissions reductions, but also of the scale of the total energy
system (Fig. 12). For every primary energy level, the production of
low-emissions energy increases with the stringency of the constraint.
Note that the higher primary energy in the 450 ppmv CO2-e scenarios
is a function largely of the character of themodels thatwere capable of
producing those scenarios rather than any sort of increasing
relationship between primary energy and long-term concentration
level.99 The one exception to this is the ETSAP-TIAM scenarios, in which primary energy
increased with the stringency of the stabilization level because the model implements
large increases in electricity production from biomass-ﬁred and coal-ﬁred plants with
CCS, both of which have relatively low efﬁciencies.6. Economic implications
6.1. Carbon prices and economic costs
Table 5 reports the Group 1 carbon prices in 2020 across scenarios.
Consistent with intuition, the results indicate that initial carbon prices
increasewith the stringency of the concentration target, are higherwith
delayed participation than full, immediate participation, and are lower if
there is an opportunity to overshoot the concentration goal. Carbon
prices in 2020 are roughly $50/tCO2 or below for both 650 ppmv CO2-e
cases as well as the 550 ppmv CO2-e cases with full participation only.
However, higher price signals are needed for the more ambitious
climate-action cases. For example, 2020 carbon prices for the not-to-
exceed 550 ppmv CO2-e scenario with delayed participation exceed
$100/tCO2 for three of the sixmodels thatwere able to achieve this case.
The prices could be reduced by following an overshoot pathway to the
concentration target or through immediate participation, though
immediate participation would require Groups 2 and 3 to take on
substantive near-term emissions reductions.
The present values of total global costs over the century are shown in
Table6. Thecalculationsarebasedona5%discount rate.Note thatbecause
the cost estimates are based on different metrics of cost from different
models, they are not strictly comparable. In general, the cost information
exhibits similar behavior to the carbon prices: the climate objective, the
nature of international participation and the possibility to overshoot the
stabilization target are signiﬁcant determinants of global policy costs.
Acrossmodels, costs range into the tens of trillions of U.S. dollars (2005$).
One characteristic of both the price and cost results is the wide
range of values acrossmodels. This variation reﬂects differences in the
underlying characteristics of the models, including variations in the
forces that lead to GHG emissions (e.g., economic growth) as well as
the ﬂexibility of the energy and underlying systems to make the
adjustments necessary to reduce emissions. It is important to note
that differences in the ability to reduce emissions are determined not
just by the energy technology and other options available today, but
Table 5
Carbon prices in Group 1 in 2020 (2005$/tCO2) across scenarios.
2020 carbon prices for Group 2 and 3 are the same as those in the table for the full participation scenarios and zero in the delayed participation scenarios. Darkened cells with an “X”
mean that the team was not able to produce the scenario. “N/A”means that the scenario was not attempted with the given model or model version.
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are a reﬂection of the technology options that will be available in the
model throughout the study period; all else being equal, the
expectation of more limited technology options beyond 2050 would
call for greater mitigation in 2020 and therefore a higher carbon price
(Clarke et al., 2007). Future technology options are highly uncertain,
and the variation in prices and costs across models is to a large degree
a reﬂection of this underlying technology and system uncertainty.
This is in addition to variations in assumptions about the rate at which
the energy system can be transformed in the near-term. In addition,
the timing of participation by Group 2 and Group 3 is not precisely
aligned across models, as noted in Table 2, and this explains some of
the variation in the impact of delayed participation.Table 6
Present value of global economic policy costs discounted at a 5% discount rate (trillion 200
GDP is used as the cost metric for FUND, GTEM, MERGE, SGM, WITCH; the area under the mar
MiniCAM. Costs based on different metrics are not exactly comparable. Darkened cells with an “X
was not attempted with the given model or model version.The forces that lead to variability in prices and costs (in addition to
differences in costmetrics) are the sameas those that inﬂuencewhether
or not models were successful in producing the more challenging
climate-action cases. Because of this, the variation in prices and costs
among climate-action cases should be interpreted with some caution.
Only subsets of the participatingmodels were able to produce scenarios
associated with the more stringent climate-action cases, so the
robustness of the results decreases with the stringency of the climate-
action cases. Indeed, the exclusion ofmodels thatwere not successful in
producing the more challenging climate-action cases inherently biases
the reported carbon prices and economic costs downward. Those
models that were able to produce the more challenging scenarios are
generally those that lie toward the lower endof the range of costs across5$) across scenarios.
ginal abatement cost curve is used as the cost metric for ETSAP-TIAM, IMAGE, MESSAGE,
”mean that the team was not able to produce the scenario. “N/A”means that the scenario
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the not-to-exceed 450 ppmv CO2-e case with full participation and the
overshoot 450 ppmv CO2-e case with delayed participation (ETSAP-
TIAM and MiniCAM) have the lowest carbon prices for the not-to-
exceed 550 ppmvCO2-e casewith full participation. If thosemodels that
generally exhibit higher prices were to model the more challenging
climate-action cases, anexpectedoutcomewould behigher price ranges
for these more challenging cases. Similarly, if the models with low
carbonprices adoptedmore conservative technology assumptions, their
prices would be expected to rise. The implication of technology
assumptions is illustrated by the difference in prices and costs between
the MESSAGE and MESSAGE-NoBECS scenarios (Krey and Riahi, 2009-
this issue) and the MiniCAM-Base and MiniCAM-LoTech scenarios
(Calvin et al., 2009a-this issue).
The price and cost results clearly demonstrate that delayed
participation will adversely affect the global economic costs of meeting
a given climate objective. The additional penalty is expected to fall
mostly on theGroup1countries, as those are theones thatwouldneed to
compensate for the lostmitigation inGroup2andGroup3.However, it is
important to note that delayed participation does not necessarily
decrease costs for the late entrants. Many of the participating models
ﬁnd that in addition toGroup1, theGroup 2 (BRICs) countriesmight also
pay a higher cost (in present value terms) if a particular concentration
goal is to be met and these countries delay mitigation. For example,
acrossmostmodels and formost climate-action cases, China's policy cost
increases in thecaseof lateparticipation (Fig. 13). This is the result of two
interacting factors. First is the fact that a delayed participation would
postponetheparticipationofGroup3bya further 20 years,meaning that
China would not be among the very last participants in mitigation and
would thereforehave to takeon someof theburdenof later entrants, just
as Group 1 does throughout the delayed participation scenarios. Second,
and more generally, although delayed participation produces an initial
period inwhich nomitigation is undertaken and no costs are incurred, it
leads to more rapid and aggressive reductions after a country begins
mitigation, assuming a particular concentration target is still to be met;
and this mitigation will take place starting from whatever carbon-
intensive technologies and infrastructures were put in place during the
no action period. This second effect depends greatly on the assumption
for the delayed participation scenarios that no mitigation takes place
prior to accession. Section 6.3 discusses how costs could be reduced ifFig. 13. Economic penalty of delayed participation in China, based on the present value of eco
FUND, GTEM, MERGE, SGM, WITCH; area under marginal abatement cost curve is used as th
ETSAP-TIAM not-to-exceed 650 ppmv CO2-e [1087%], ETSAP-TIAM overshoot 550 ppmv CO
CO2-e [558%], MESSAGE overshoot 550 ppmv CO2-e [256%]. Large relative costs in these mod
the costs in general for these climate-action cases.)the Group 2 and Group 3 countries were to anticipate their future
mitigation requirements.
6.2. The potential magnitude of wealth transfers implied to spur
participation
The discussion to this point has sidestepped the issue of emissions
allocationsorﬁnancial transfers among regions and countries in order to
achieve the climate-action cases. One reason for this is that it is well
established in economics that the distribution of the cost can be
separated in principle from emissions mitigation through various
mechanisms such as income transfers or — in the context of cap-and-
trade regimes — the assignment of emissions allocations. At the same
time, the adverse economic implications of delayed international
participation in the delayed participation climate-action cases indicate
a need for incentives to induce a broad cooperation. It is therefore useful
to explore the general magnitude of the ﬁnancial transfers involved in
achieving full participation. To shed light on this issue, a subset of
modelling teams computed the ﬁnancial transfers that would be
required to leave Group 2 and Group 3 regions just as well off under a
scenario inwhich they began emissionsmitigation simultaneouslywith
Group 1 regions, as theywould have been by delaying participation. The
models conducted this experiment by assuming an international carbon
market inwhichnon-participating countries are allocated their baseline
emissions. Fig. 14 reports the resulting ﬁnancial transfers from Group 1
to Group 2 and Group 3 (equal to the annual carbon pricemultiplied by
the quantity of carbon traded) from2020 to 2050. Transfers are found to
increase with the stringency of the climate objective, mostly because of
the rising carbon prices. Some models ﬁnd that the possibility to
overshoot the stabilization target reduces the ﬁnancial ﬂows, but in
general themonetary transfers in the 550 ppmv CO2-e case are found to
be quite signiﬁcant, in the range of several hundred billions of U.S.
dollars per year. At these levels, the carbon market would eventually
resemble a large commoditymarket suchas the oilmarket. For example,
at a price of $50/barrel, Group 1 oil imports today equal roughly
$0.5trillion (2005$); this value is obtained in the carbon market by all
models by mid century in the 550-e climate-action cases.
Fig. 14 also provides an indication of the recipients of the transfers.
The largest share is shown to mostly go to Group 3, which faces the
more distant commitment. Group 2 would only receive transfers priornomic policy costs (discounted at a 5% discount rate). GDP is used as the cost metric for
e cost metric for ETSAP-TIAM, IMAGE, MESSAGE, MiniCAM. (Costs are not included for
2-e [−793%], ETSAP-TIAM not-to-exceed [−636%], MESSAGE not-to-exceed 650 ppmv
els for the less aggressive climate-action cases are due in part to the small magnitude of
ig. 14. Average ﬁnancial transfers out of Group 1 (OECD) in an international carbon
arket from 2020 to 2050, calculated as undiscounted averages. The lower blackened
art of each bar represents the transfers to Group 2 (BRICs).
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m
pto 2030— a period inwhich transferswould be relatively small. Group 2
generally becomes a buyer of permits after they join the climate
coalition in 2030.
6.3. The role of policy anticipation
The delayed participation scenarios in EMF 22 are based on the
assumption that non-participatory regions undertake nomitigation prior
to accession. This raises thequestionofwhether thedownsidesofdelayed
participation could be reduced if non-participatory countries were to
agree, during negotiations, to the timing and magnitude of reductions,
even thoughsuch reductionswouldnotbeginuntil some futuredate. Two
intertemporal models that can be run with and without foresight (i.e.,
intertemporal optimization) ran this experiment,MERGE (Blanford et al.,
2009-this issue) and WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2009-this issue). Speciﬁcally,
the experiment assumed that Group 2 (BRICs) would agree now to join
the coalition post-2030 andGroup 3post-2050. Neitherwould commit to
reductions prior to accession, but both would be allowed to conﬁgure
their capital stock, and make the associated emissions reductions, in
anticipation of their future commitments. The costs from this experiment
were then compared with those under the assumption that Group 2 and
Group 3 followed their baseline prior to participation.
Table 7 below shows the reduction in costs in the twomodels due to
entering into an agreement today, and acting in anticipation of such
entry, even though actual obligations do not begin until a future date. If
Group2 is going to enter the coalition at a given date in the future, it is in
their best interest to anticipate their futuremitigation, rather than enter
with a poorly conﬁgured capital stock. Thiswould certainly be the case if
they stayed on their BAU path until the commitment date. When the
Group 2 countries prepare in advance for a post-2030 accession, the
present value of GDP losses is reduced by 31% and 23%, in MERGE and
WITCH, respectively. This results from gradually moving to a lower
carbon energy systemprior to accession, thereby reducing the degree of
turnover in the energy system that might be required after accession.Table 7
Cost savings (costs expressed as present value of GDP losses) under delayed
participation with and without anticipation of the future mitigation commitment in
the not-to exceed 550 CO2-e climate-action case (MERGE Pessimistic is used for the
MERGE scenarios).
Group 1 Group 2 (BRICs)
MERGE WITCH MERGE WITCH
51% 46% 31% 23%The Group 1 countries also beneﬁt from anticipation and associated
early mitigation by Group 2 and Group 3. Their losses are reduced by
approximately one-half in both models, which is more substantial than
the degree of emissions reduction that they achieve in the anticipation
cases (see Bosetti et al., 2009-this issue; Blanford et al., 2009-this issue).
Thishighlights thenon-linearnatureof abatement costs. Initial reductions
inGroup1are less expensive than those associatedwithﬁlling thegap left
by developing country non-participation in coming decades.
7. Additional issues addressed by the scenarios
In addition to modeling the coordinated scenarios, participating
modeling teamswere encouraged to pursue supplemental insights via
additional scenarios. This section summarizes a number of insights
and directs readers to the relevant papers for details. This section is by
no means exhaustive in cataloging the insights that can be gleaned
from all the papers in this volume.
Several modeling groups explored the role of speciﬁc technologies,
such as CCS, nuclear, energy efﬁciency, and bioCCS. These analyses
explored the implications of different combinations of available
technologies. Krey and Riahi (2009-this issue), for example, ﬁnd
that the overshoot 450 CO2-e scenario (2.6 W/m2) with immediate
global participation is unattainable without CCS with the MESSAGE
model. In contrast, Calvin et al. (2009a-this issue) ﬁnd that the target
is still attainable but it requires 1100 new 1000 MW nuclear reactors
in 2020. Blanford et al. (2009-this issue) ﬁnd that diffusion of new
technologies to developing countries increases the value of these
technologies substantially. While R&D has a high payoff domestically,
the payoff globally is an order of magnitude higher. Bosetti et al. (2009-
this issue) ﬁnd that delayed participation initially increases the R&D
effort by exerting additional pressure on the knowledge base in
developed economies, but ultimately leads to reduced technical change
and deployment of low-carbon technologies.
Uncertainties were also evaluated across the papers in this volume
via a variety of approaches. Most studies considered uncertainties
with deterministic sensitivity analysis of, for instance, available
technologies and alternative baselines. For example, Krey and Riahi
(2009-this issue), Calvin et al. (2009a,b-this issue), Blanford et al.
(2009-this issue), and van Vliet et al. (2009-this issue) explore the
implications of technology availability. Blanford et al. (2009-this
issue) also explore the implications of economic growth, and a
recession in particular. They ﬁnd that a near-term recession does not
fundamentally alter the nature of the climate management challenge.
Other papers explore uncertainty using more formal treatments. Krey
and Riahi (2009-this issue) laid climate sensitivity uncertainties over
radiative forcing pathways to evaluate the likelihood of exceeding
temperature objectives. Loulou et al. (2009-this issue) used stochastic
modeling to explore optimal hedging strategies given alternative
possible resolutions of climate sensitivity. The authors ﬁnd that the
uncertainties in the resulting climate and the signiﬁcantly higher costs
associated with achieving the 450 ppmv CO2-e targets provide
justiﬁcation for hedging and implementing stronger early mitigation
action. Tol (2009-this issue) creates 170,000 policy scenarios to
explore the feasibility of stringent targets, systematically varying the
price of carbon, participation in climate policy, the strength of the
climate feedback on the terrestrial carbon cycle, the no-policy
scenario, and the abatement costs.
A few papers commented speciﬁcally on leakage. Delayed regional
participation raises important questions about potential leakage of both
production and emissions. Gurney et al. (2009-this issue) ﬁnd both
kinds of leakage to non-OECD countries with energy-intensive goods
and agricultural production, which has implications for emission-
intensive commodity trade and internationalﬂows of investment funds.
Meanwhile, Calvin et al. (2009b-this issue) ﬁnd that industrial leakage
to non-participating regions is less than 10% when all regions of the
world begin emissions mitigation by 2050. Bosetti et al. (2009-this
S80 L. Clarke et al. / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S64–S81issue) also report relatively small international leakage in industrial
emissions. However, Calvin et al. (2009a-this issue) ﬁnd that leakage in
agricultural sectors and therefore in emissions from land use change
could be substantial and potentially larger than industrial leakage.
Several groups focused on alternative policy structures or goals to
those in the main body of core scenarios. Russ and van Ierland (2009-
this issue) explored scenarios that allow for differentiated participa-
tion of developing countries from 2012 onwards and a gradual
development of a carbon market. They ﬁnd that costs were decreased
substantially compared to the delayed participation scenarios in
which major countries delay their participation to after 2030. Van
Vliet et al. (2009-this issue) explored the implications of radiative
forcing target of 2.9 W/m2, which lies in between the 450 ppmv CO2-e
and 550 ppmv CO2-e targets. Russ and van Ierland explored the
implications of a 3.1 W/m2 radiative forcing target.
Additional extensions beyond those discussed above include the
role of non-CO2 GHGs (Krey and Riahi, 2009-this issue; Calvin et al.,
2009a-this issue), the implications of uncertainty in the behavior of
the global terrestrial biosphere (Tol, 2009-this issue), and optimal
mitigation in a cost-beneﬁt framework (Tol, 2009-this issue).
8. Summary
Stabilizing the global climate will require a very different world
than the one we live in today. The EMF 22 International Scenarios
have explored the interactions between three factors that inﬂuence
how the future might evolve: the long-term target, the timing and
nature of international participation in climate mitigation, and the
degree to which the target might be temporarily exceeded.
In general, the results from this study conﬁrm intuition about these
forces and their interactions. The challenge of mitigation increases
with the stringency of the target, and the more ambitious of the
climate-action cases explored in this study are particularly challeng-
ing. Even with overshoot and immediate and comprehensive interna-
tional action, only eight of 14 models were successful in producing
scenarios thatmet the 450 ppmv CO2-e target by 2100 due to the large
and rapid changes required in energy and related systems tomeet this
ambitious target. Only two models could produce this climate-action
case assuming delayed participation. No model was able to meet the
not-to-exceed 450 ppmv CO2-e assuming delayed participation.
Similarly, a number of models were not successful in producing
scenarios for the 550 ppmv CO2-e targets under delayed participation.
Despite these challenges, a number of models did produce scenarios
for many of the more ambitious climate-action cases; these scenarios
provide valuable guidance on how such ambitious targets might be
achieved, and they demonstrate the exceptional speed andmagnitude
of the associated changes in energy and related systems.
A failure to develop a comprehensive, international approach to
climate mitigation will constrain efforts to meet ambitious climate-
related targets. Without early, comprehensive action bymajor emitting
regions, concentrations may exceed particularly ambitious targets such
as 450 ppmv CO2-e and even 550 ppmv CO2-e. Furthermore, in shifting
emissionsmitigation toward those countries taking early action (Group
1 in this exercise), emissions reductions may be required in those
countries that arewell beyondwhat they arewilling to bear in the near-
term. Regardless of the target, the global costs of achieving any long-
term climate-related target will be higher without comprehensive
action, and theymaybehigher not just for the initial entrants but also for
those that join along the way.
The ability to temporarily exceed, or overshoot, long-termgoalsmay
make some of the more stringent long-term climate limitation goals
more achievable and lessen the impacts of a failure to achieve
comprehensive action, but these pathways come at a cost. Overshoot
pathways will lead to greater environmental consequences than
pathways that keep concentrations below their long-term goal. In
addition, because they shift emissionsmitigation from thepresent to thefuture, they also come with the risk that future emissions reductions of
the scale needed to meet the goal may not materialize.
This study leaves many questions unanswered. It does not address
the wide range of possible policy approaches for mitigation, including
both different regional responsibilities than those explored in this study
and non-price-based mechanisms, such as technology standards and
sectoral policies. Although these scenarios comment on the require-
ments for meeting particular temperature goals, they are not designed
speciﬁcally to explore temperature goals or other potentially relevant
goals (e.g., ocean pH). The scenarios provide insight into the technology
deployment elements of mitigation futures, but not into the means to
achieve technology development and diffusion. A great deal of research
remains to be done to truly understand the character of future worlds,
and future energy systems in particular, thatmust be verydifferent from
those of today, if climate goals such as those examined in this study are
to be realized. Continuing research will help to inform these and other
issues, and to provide timely and relevant information as the
community of the world's nations moves forward with individual and
collective actions to address climate change.References
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